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United States and West Germany
I. INTRODUCTION
On 22 January 1973 the U.S. Supreme Court substantially cur-
tailed the power of the American states to prohibit or limit the right
of a woman to procure an abortion.' On 25 February 1975, the West
German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the German Parlia-
ment, by permiting abortions within the first three months of preg-
nancy, violated the constitutional rights of unborn children.2 These
decisions provide us with an uncommon opportunity to compare the
constitutional law of different nations on abortion. That the highest
tribunals of two robust constitutional democracies and secular politi-
cal cultures should decide differently the question of the unborn
child's right to life under the constitutions of their respective coun-
tries must excite curiosity, no matter one's stand or stake in the abor-
tion controversy.
This article seeks to restate and assess the reasoning in support
of the doctrinal results in the German and American cases and then
to relate those results to the legal cultures and constitutional values
of the two countries. Yet we cannot wholly separate the two decisions
from their political contexts or from the debate, intense in both coun-
tries, about the role of the judiciary in their respective systems of
government. In both countries the very propriety of judicial inter-
vention in the policy-making process on abortion has been severely
deplored. In fact, the issue of the judiciary's role in the making of
abortion policy received considerable stress by the dissenting justices
of both tribunals. Thus we cannot afford to ignore the issue here.
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1. See 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
2. Judgment of 25 Feb. 1975, 39 BVerfG 1-95 (1975). The decisions of
the Federal Constitutional Court are reported in Entscheidungen des Bundes-
verfassungsgerichts (1952-date). The official abbreviation of these reports is
BVerfG.
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Democracy and constitutionalism, although capable of creatively
coexisting within the same political order, are principles with a fre-
quent aversion for one another. The tension between these principles
is clear in the abortion cases. The ruling in both regimes represents
a judicial veto of legislative policy. In the United States and West
Germany, however, judicial authorities are empowered to review stat-
utes on constitutional grounds and if they find, in a case properly
before them, that an act of the legislature is in conflict with the Con-
stitution, they may nullify the act or refuse to enforce it. In a regime
of judicial review, authority of the judiciary to void legislation raises
serious questions about the relationship between courts and legisla-
tures, particularly since the line separating constitutionality and un-
constitutionality is thin and often the source of lively dispute between
fair and reasonable men. A full comprehension of the abortion deci-
sions will require some further mention of this relationship in the two
political systems together with some discussion of the legal rules
governing the jurisdiction of the deciding tribunals.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The United States
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton involved litigants in Texas and
Georgia who challenged on federal constitutional grounds their re-
spective state statutes limiting the right of a woman to obtain a legal
abortion.3 These statutes were typical of most state laws on abortion.
The Texas law prohibited abortion unless procured by medical advice
for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.4 When Wade and
Bolton were decided, the criminal abortion laws of a majority of states
were similarly restrictive. For the most part, these laws were carbon
copies of state statutes enacted in the early nineteenth century.
Georgia's statute, patterned after the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code,5 was of more recent vintage. Revised in 1968, it
limited legal abortions to situations where (1) a continuation of the
pregnancy would endanger the life or seriously and permanently in-
jure the health of the pregnant woman, (2) the fetus would very likely
be born with a grave, permanent, and irremediable mental or physical
defect, or (3) the pregnancy resulted from forcible or statutory rape.
Among the statute's procedural and evidentiary provisions was the
requirement of a written medical opinion by a physician stating that
an abortion is justified under the statute along with the written con-
currence in that opinion of at least two other physicians licensed to
practice medicine in Georgia.6
3. Supra n.1.
4. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann., Arts 1191-96 (1961).
5. Model Penal Code, sec. 2303 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
6. Ga. Code Ann., sec. 26-1202 (1972).
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Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in these cases, abortion was
a criminal offense in all the American states. Historically, the social
judgments which these laws embodied enjoyed a firm mooring in the
nation's moral consciousness. But within a relatively short period of
time, roughly during the 1960's, public support for restrictive abortion
laws seemed dramatically to erode, although today's public opinion
polls still show substantial minority support for such laws. More im-
portant was the reversal in educated American opinion, particularly
within the legal and medical communities, which probably laid the
foundation for the liberalization of some state abortion laws, notably
that of New York, effectively allowing abortion on demand up to the
24th week of pregnancy.
7
Another striking instance of this shift in influential opinion was
the 1972 report of the President's Commission on Population Growth,
which recommended that abortion be readily available in all the
states.8 Yet in spite of such pronouncements and in the face of mount-
ing opposition to restrictive abortion statutes, state legislators gener-
ally held firm in their conviction that existing laws were not only
a fair accommodation between the interests of pregnant women and
unborn children, but also a reflection of predominant moral feeling
among their constituents. Wade and Bolton came to the Supreme
Court within this general context of continuing state legislative sup-
port of policies proscribing abortion. Wade involved a pregnant single
woman, Bolton an indigent, married, pregnant woman, both of whom
sought declaratory judgments that their respective state abortions
laws (Texas and Georgia) were unconstitutional.
Some commentators have strenuously argued that the Supreme
Court exceeded its rightful authority in reaching the merits of Wade
and Bolton, for the female litigants had already terminated their preg-
nancies-rendering their cases moot in the eyes of the Court's critics-
and were in no immediate danger of losing their liberty or being de-
7. N.Y. Pen. Law, sec. 125.05 (McKinney Supp., 1971).
8. See Population and the American Future, The Report of the Commis-
sion on Population Growth and the American Future 142 (1972). Leo Pfeffer
offers an interesting if not wholly convincing explanation of this startling shift
of opinion: "Partly it is to be found in changing standards of morality (mani-
fested, if not to some extent caused, by Supreme Court decisions practically
making pornography legal) which now seems to accept premarital sexual rela-
tions; partly the women's liberation movement and its claim that a woman
has the right to decide what will happen to her own body; partly in the recog-
nition (though hardly new) that realistically the choice is not between legal
abortions and no abortions, but between safe legal ones and dangerous, sordid,
illegal ones. All this is true, yet it is probable that a major factor here, as
in the case of contraceptive birth control, is the taxpayer's revolt against ris-
ing welfare rolls and costs. Legalization of contraception not having worked
to an acceptable degree, and other measures . . . proving too Draconian for
public acceptance, permissible abortion, encouraged by the state, is the next
logical step." God, Caesar, and the Constitution 99-100 (1975).
19771
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prived of a federal constitutional right." According to this view, the
parties had no "standing to sue" and were therefore incapable of in-
voking the Court's jurisdiction. 10 However, the Court remarked in
Wade that litigation involving pregnancy, Which is "capable of repeti-
tion" is an exception to the federal rule that an actual controversy
must exist at the time a case is decided on appeal. 1 In Bolton the
Court held that even licensed physicians consulted by pregnant
women have standing to sue because they are within reach of the law's
criminal provisions. These physicians "should not be required to
await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking
relief, 1 2 asserted the Court. Thus, the abortion cases were capable
of judicial resolution.
Some of the Court's critics have noted that this apparent stretch-
ing of the standing rule is the result of significant enlargement of
the Court's own perception of its institutional role. They would prob-
ably agree with Richard A. Epstein's assertion that "the Supreme
Court today views constitutional litigation as a means of settling great
conflicts of the social order."1 On the other hand, as Tocqueville once
reminded us, all great political conflicts in America tend eventually
to resolve themselves into constitutional questions.1 4  Failing to
achieve their objectives by political means, proponents of liberalized
abortion laws naturally gravitated to the judiciary, seeking victory
on more favorable terrain. For purposes of this analysis, however,
it is not the victory that is important, but rather the Court's own ca-
pacity to persuade a reasonably open mind of the validity and propri-
ety of its ultimate ruling.
B. West Germany
The German case provides an intriguing contrast to the American
situation. First, although West Germany is a federal republic com-
posed of ten states, excluding West Berlin, the making of abortion pol-
9. See Epstein, "Substantive Due Process by any Other Name: The Abor-
tion Cases," The Supreme Court Review 1973 160-67 (1974).
10. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). There is a rule in American
constitutional law that federal courts are powerless to adjudicate a case unless
it is "presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution." This means that the judicial power of the
United States can be invoked only in a concrete case (i.e. a real controversy,
not a contrived or friendly suit) by a litigant who has sustained or is imme-
diately in danger of sustaining an injury under federal law or the Constitution.
Such a constraint is one way of confining the political and social roles of the
federal judiciary in a manner consistent with the constitutional principle of
separation of powers.
11. 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
12. 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973).
13. Epstein, supra n.9 at 161.
14. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 207 (Henry Reeve transl. 1835).
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icy falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the national govern-
ment. Unlike the bulk of criminal law in the United States, the Penal
Code, Section 218 of which provides penalties for illegal abortion, is
national law. Originally based on the Prussian Penal Code of 1851,
the current code was adopted by the German Reich in 1871.15 The
code provisions on abortion under inspection here were associated with
a major effort in Germany to revise and reform the criminal code as a
whole. The Revised Penal Code went into effect on 2 January 1975.15a
Second, the Basic Law of 1949 (Grundgesetz) confers on the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court explicit and far-reaching powers of judicial
review. Among these powers is the Court's authority to resolve "dif-
ferences of opinion or doubts on the formal and material compatibility
of federal law or land [state] law with this Basic Law."1 6 This is
known as an abstract judicial review proceeding (abstrakte Normen-
kontrolle), which can be initiated only by the Federal Government
(Chancellor and Cabinet), a state government, or one third of the
Bundestag's members.'7 The proceeding is called "abstract" because
no concrete controversy involving adverse parties engaged in litigation
before the regular courts is required, as in the United States, to trigger
the exercise of judicial review. Thus politicians and governments may
draw the Federal Constitutional Court into their political conflicts al-
most at will, risking the possibility of the Court blunting government
by majority rule well before the democratic process is fully played
out."'8 Thus a defeated legislative minority of 100 delegates or more
is able, as happened in the Abortion Case, to transfer a controversy
directly from the legislature to the Constitutional Court if the statute,
once duly promulgated, is challenged on constitutional grounds.' 9
15. See German Penal Code of 1871, § 218 at 114, The American Series of
Foreign Penal Codes (1961).
15a. Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) in the version of 2 January 1975 (BGB1. I 1,
7 Jan. 75 at 2; SaB1. Nr. 5, 31 Jan. 75 at 209.
16. See Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz),
Art. 93, § 1, 2. The provisions of the West German Basic Law relating to the
authority and organization of the Federal Constitutional Court have been im-
plemented by the Federal Constitutional Court Act of 12 March 1951 (Gesetz
fiber das Bundesverfassungsgericht), 1951 BGB1. I 243. Hereafter the Act is
cited as BVerfGG.) For a fuller discussion of the Court's authority see Kom-
mers, Judicial Politics in West Germany: A Study of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court 100-03 (1976).
17. BVerfGG § 13(6). There are fourteen other types of proceedings
which the Court may hear under the law and the Constitution. Each requires
special procedures and litigants. In only one of these proceedings-the con-
stitutional complaint-may an individual citizen invoke the Court's jurisdic-
tion. All other cases are brought by agencies, branches, or levels of govern-
ment.
18. But in fact the Constitutional Court has exercised this jurisdiction very
cautiously. Frequently, the Court will simply sit on a case and not decide
it in the expectation that the initiating party will withdraw the case or that
the dispute will be resolved politically before the Court decides.
19. In addition, the Abortion Reform Act was challenged in the Federal
1977]
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Such a capability would on first impression appear anomalous in a
parliamentary democracy powered by a responsible party system,
committed to majority rule.
Yet the Federal Constitutional Court has been one of the strongest
guardians of the democratic process in West Germany, seeking to in-
sure, for example, that the system of political representation operates
to guarantee public policies reasonably in accord with the "general
will. ' 20 Since it has been alleged in some circles that the decision-
making process here violated the principle of democratic responsibil-
ity, we should recapitulate the steps leading to the parliamentary ap-
proval of the Abortion Reform Act of 1974.1
In contrast to the United States, where long-standing abortion
statutes were not the subject of extended legislative discussion prior
to their sudden invalidation by the Supreme Court, the new German
policy had long been preceeded by a lively national debate. Like most
American state laws, the German Penal Code since the mid-nineteenth
century had placed a ban on abortion however and whenever per-
formed. The old abortion statute included the following provisions:
1. A woman who destroys her fetus or permits it to be
destroyed by another shall be punished by imprisonment,
and in especially serious cases by confinement in a pen-
itentiary.
2. The attempt is punishable.
3. Any other person who destroys the fetus of a pregnant
woman shall be punished by confinement in a peniten-
tiary and in less serious cases by imprisonment.
4. Anybody who supplies a pregnant woman with a drug
or object designed to destroy the fetus, shall be punished
by imprisonment, and in especially serious cases by con-
finement in a penitentiary. 22
Subject to considerable official scrutiny during the time of the Weimar
Republic, this law was relaxed in its severity by a 1927 decision of
the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht), which held that an abortion pro-
cured for medical reasons (medizinische Indikationen)-that is, when
necessary to preserve the life and health of the pregnant woman-
was not punishable under the law. 23 An abortion procured by legiti-
mate medical means to preserve the mother's life is an "extra-legal
Constitutional Court by the governments of Baden-Wiirttemberg, Saarland,
Bavaria, Schleswig-Holstein, and Rhineland-Pfalz.
20. See Kommers, "Politics and Jurisprudence in West Germany: State Fi-
nancing of Political Parties," The Am. J. Jur. 215-241 (1971).
21. The Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law of 18 June 1974, 1974
BGBI. 1 1297.
22. German Penal Code, supra n. 15 at 114.
23. Judgment of 11 March 1927, 61 RGSt (Entscheidungen des Reichge-
richts in Strafsachen) 242,
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emergency" (iibergesetzliche Notstand), said the Court, and can be
justified within broad principles of the criminal law.
24
In the 1950's another comprehensive review of abortion policy took
place, culminating in the German Draft Penal Code of 1962.25 The
Draft Code continued to treat abortion as a punishable offense, but
lowered considerably the maximum penalty. In addition, the pro-
posed code permitted the destruction of the fetus by a physician "if
according to medical knowledge and experience, danger of death or
of undue and serious injury to the body or health . . . of the woman
can be averted only by the abortion. '26 Under considerable pressure
to liberalize abortion policy, Parliament nevertheless failed to enact
these provisions into law. Indeed, there was considerable parliamen-
tary sentiment in favor of decriminalizing abortion within the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy, mainly because of the feeling among legis-
lators that penal sanctions were of little use in deterring abortions.
Between 1965 and 1972, Parliament considered several abortion re-
form bills, but none commanded anything close to majority support.
27
Finally, in April 1972, a special committee on criminal law reform held
public hearings on two major proposals, one offering an "indications"
solution and the other a "term" solution as a means of liberalizing
the old abortion law.28 The first proposal, introduced by the Federal
Government, would have allowed an abortion in four situations: To
preserve the life and health of the mother ("medical indications");
to avert the birth of a seriously defective child ("eugenic indica-
tions"); to terminate a pregnancy caused by a sexual assault ("ethical
indications"); and to unburden the woman of extremely harmful con-
sequences that would arise in the event of the child's birth ("social
indications"). In the last two situations an abortion would have been
permissible only in the first trimester of pregnancy, subject to the
24. 39 BVerfG 6.
25. German Draft Penal Code, § 140(1) at 91, The American Series of For-
eign Penal Codes (1966).
26. Id., § 157(1) at 97. It is of some comparative interest to note that
similar provisions were contained in the Model Penal Code proposed by the
American Law Institute in 1962. See Model Penal Code, Proposed Official
Draft § 230.3 (1962). Needless to say, the provisions of the Model Penal Code
would be invalid under the constitutional standards of Roe v. Wade.
27. These details of the parliamentary debate are drawn from the Federal
Constitutional Court's own account of the legislative history leading up to the
passage of the Abortion Reform Act of 1974. See 39 BVerfG 6-18.
28. "Indications solution" (IndikationsIbsung) and "term solution" (Fris-
tenlbsung) are commonly used expressions in Germany when referring to
abortion policy. These terms are awkward in English but we shall use them
here anyway. An indications solution means that a pregnancy may be inter-
rupted at any time for reasons defined by law; a term solution means that
an abortion would be permitted, for whatever reason, within a given stage of
pregnancy, usually within the first trimester. There has been great contro-
versy in Germany over which is the better or more equitable solution to the
abortion controversy.
1977]
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sole condition that the operation be performed by a licensed physician
after the woman had submitted to professional counseling.
The second proposal-a term solution-would have rested a deci-
sion to abort a fetus entirely with the woman and her physician within
the first three months of pregnancy. But even the governing coalition
of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party
(FDP) headed by Chancellor Willy Brandt felt that this measure,.fail-
ing adequately to protect unborn life, was too extreme. The Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) and its conservative Bavarian affiliate, the
Christian Social Union (CSU), were in opposition to both bills. Thus
abortion policy in West Germany, unlike the United States, became
the subject of partisan controversy, with the ensuing parliamentary
strife mirroring the fierce clash of opposing groups in the society at
large. But a domestic economic crisis resulted in the premature dis-
solution of Parliament, and with the calling of new federal elections
in November 1972 the legislative debate on abortion came to a sudden
close.
Surprisingly, abortion reform was not debated by the contesting
political parties in the 1972 election campaign. 29 Social Democrats,
needing Catholic votes, were especially reluctant to raise the issue,
although Free Democrats occasionally spoke out in favor of a lib-
eralized abortion law. As a consequence, the Brandt Government,
even though returning to power with a substantial parliamentary ma-
jority, could not easily claim to have a popular mandate for an abor-
tion reform policy, and none was introduced by the Government in
the newly elected Parliament. Instead, four separate bills proposed
by individual legislators and party groups were referred to a special
committee on penal law reform. These bills included proposals rang-
ing from a policy of abortion on demand in the early months of preg-
nancy, favored by a small group of SPD-FDP delegates, to an abortion
policy restricted to medical indications, favored by Christian Demo-
crats. None received majority support in the special committee,
whereupon, in an unusual move, all four bills were sent to the floor
of the Bundestag.
The new Abortion Reform Act of 1974, which was backed by a
majority of SPD and FDP delegates, amended the Penal Code in the
following ways: First, termination of a pregnancy would no longer
be punishable during the first twelve weeks after conception if per-
formed by a licensed physician with the consent of the pregnant
woman (§ 218a); second, destruction of the fetus would be permissible
after the first twelve weeks if warranted by medical or eugenic indi-
cations and procured prior to the twenty-second week of pregnancy
29. For a detailed account of the 1972 election campaign see Heidenheimer
& Kommers, The Governments of Germany ch. 5 (4th ed. 1975).
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(§ 218b); finally, the person or physician terminating the pregnancy-
not the pregnant woman-would be punishable under the Act (§
218d). Criminal penalties would continue to operate with respect to
abortions performed after the third month of pregnancy, except in
those instances where medical, eugenic, or ethical indications would
justify the fetus' destruction.
3 0
We should note that those Germans who might have wished a
stout parliamentary defense of the pregnant woman's right to inter-
rupt a pregnancy would recoil before the SPD-FDP's rationale in sup-
port of the Reform Act, for the new policy was ostensibly based on
a theory of deterrence. Whatever the feeling toward abortion outside
Parliament, the legislative reform was not predicated on any pre-
sumed right of women flatly to terminate their pregnancies. The
counseling section of the new law was simply regarded as a more ef-
fective method of turning pregnant women away from abortion and
of protecting unborn life than resort to criminal sanctions. This strat-
egy was adopted in the awareness that women, despite criminal penal-
ties, were resorting increasingly to illegal abortion. Thus the decrimi-
nalization of abortion in the early months of pregnancy was no ringing
affirmation of a female bill of rights; it merely represented an attempt
by Parliament to adjust the legal order to an evolving social reality.
Even so, the Act came under instant attack, which was both politi-
cal and constitutional. On the political side some Christian Democrats
suggested-and this ties in with the earlier-mentioned argument based
on democratic theory-that there was no mandate in support of the
abortion statute. And the haste with which the bill was finally passed
precluded any meaningful consultation between the Government,
charged under the Basic Law with the primary responsibility of set-
ting policy guidelines,3 1 and the Parliament. Moreover, as the Consti-
tutional Court itself acknowledged, the bill failed to command ma-
jority support upon first balloting in the Bundestag, and was finally
accepted by fewer than an absolute majority of delegates as the less
objectionable of two proposals which survived an earlier ballot taken
to eliminate those bills with least support. Thus, the bill finally ap-
proved was not the first, nor in many cases the second, choice of legis-
lators voting for it. From the point of view of democratic theory,
then, opponents of the bill could suggest that the statute did not bear
the clear stamp of legitimacy marking a policy generated within a par-
liamentary democracy.
The more serious challenge to the Abortion Reform Act was con-
stitutional. The ink had barely dried on the Act when the state gov-
ernments of Baden-Wuirttemberg, Bavaria, Rhineland-Pfalz, Saarland,
30. Art. 65, Basic Law (1949).
31. N. 21 supra.
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and Schleswig-Holstein-half of the German states-together with 193
members of the Bundestag-all Christian Democrats-filed petitions
with the Federal Constitutional Court challenging the Act's validity
under several provisions of the Basic Law. On 21 June 1974 the Court
responded by issuing a temporary injunction enjoining the application
of the law pending a full determination of its constitutionality.
III. THE COURTS SPEAK
A. The American Decision
There are several interesting steps in the Supreme Court's argu-
ment in Wade and Bolton. Speaking through Mr. Justice Blackmun,
the Coutt first explored the historical origin of American state abor-
tion laws. Its rather detailed excursion through history includes a
description of abortion policy as reflected in Greek and Roman Law,
the Hippocratic Oath, Common Law, English statutory law, and
American law, followed by an analysis of the evolving policy and cur-
rent attitudes of the American Medical Association, the American
Public Health Association, and the American Bar Association. With-
out indicating precisely the relevance of its historical overview to the
doctrinal point made later in the opinion, the Court then hastens into
a discussion of the reasons justifying American criminal abortion stat-
utes; after noting that most were passed in the latter half of the nine-
teenth century, the Court concludes that they were intended mainly
for the purpose of protecting the woman from a dangerous medical
procedure as well as for the purpose of preserving prenatal life.32
Justice Blackmun then turns to a consideration of the right to
privacy. Acknowledging that the Constitution does not explicitly
mention any such right, he affirms its existence by implication, citing
several decisions in which the Court has found in varying contexts
at least the roots of that right under assorted provisions of the Consti-
tution. The conclusion of the Court deserves to be quoted in full:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court
determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights
to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's de-
cision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detri-
ment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman
by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and
direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy
may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may
force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psy-
chological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical
32. 410 U.S. 113, 130-150 (1973).
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health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress,
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other
cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing
stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these
are factors the woman and responsible physician necessarily
will consider in consultation.8 8
However, cautioned the court, the right of personal privacy is not ab-
solute. At some point in pregnancy, wrote Justice Blackmun, "a state
may assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining
medical standards, and in protecting potential life.
'8 4
Crucial to the outcome of the Abortion Cases was the question
of whether the Fourteenth Amendment protects the unborn fetus
from indiscriminate destruction. 5 Justice Blackmun answered by de-
claring that the fetus is not a "person" within the Amendment's pro-
tection. Taking judicial notice of the historical conflict among theolo-
gians, philosophers, and physicians over the issue of the fetus' person-
hood, the Court simply asserted: "We need not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins."136 When, then, does the state acquire
a legitimate interest in protecting "potential life?" Approximately at
the end of the second trimester of pregnancy, when the fetus has be-
come viable, answers the Court. At this stage, the state "may, if it
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is nec-
essary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the
life or health of the mother. '3 7 At the end of the first trimester the
state may begin to regulate the abortion procedure in the interest of
promoting the health of the mother, but it may not constitutionally
prohibit abortions altogether. During the first trimester the state is
powerless to assert any legitimate interest in regulating abortion: at
this stage the woman's right to privacy is predominant; the abortion
decision "must be left to [her and] the medical judgment of the preg-
nant woman's attending physician.
'88
Dissenting opinions were written by Justices White and Rehn-
quist. In one of his strongest dissents ever, Justice White described
the majority opinion as "an exercise in raw judicial power," one which
effectively upholds, and imposes upon the states, a policy of abortion
33. Id. at 153.
34. Id. at 154.
35. According to § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment: "No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
36. 410 U.S. 113, 159, (1973).
37. Id. at 165.
38. Id. at 164.
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on demand. "The Court simply fashions and announces a new consti-
tutional right for pregnant mothers and with scarcely any reason or
authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance
to override most existing state abortion statutes. 3 9 In White's view,
the Court had merely substituted its values with respect to the order-
ing of priorities between mother and unborn child for those of the
states, a policy which "should be left with the people and to the politi-
cal processes the people have devised to govern their affairs. '40 Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in an opinion which questioned the plaintiffs' standing,
also attacked the sweeping invalidation of all restrictions on abortion
during the first trimester of pregnancy. He denied that the right to
privacy was involved in these cases and reproached the majority for
ignoring the history of the Fourteenth Amendment whose adoption
discloses, according to the Justice, no understanding in the minds of
the framers that unborn children were not to be regarded as "persons"
within its protection.
4 1
Three justices concurred in the majority opinion. Chief Justice
Burger, displeased with the dissenting Justices' wide interpretation
of the majority opinion, rejected the contention that the rule in the
cases permits abortion on demand. Justice Douglas, hedging against
a too-narrow interpretation of the rule and meeting Justice White's
argument about the ordering of priorities between fetus and mother,
found Georgia's statute constitutionally defective precisely "because
it equates the value of embryonic life immediately after conception
with the worth of life immediately before birth" and because the stat-
ute fails to include the psychological as well as the physical "health"
of the woman as a permissible reason for the right of a woman to
interrupt her pregnancy prior to viability.42 In Douglas' view, the
right of a woman to procure an abortion was well within the marital
privacy cases on contraception. The concurring opinion of Justice
Stewart was a reluctant acceptance-a capitulation following his long
resistance, beginning with the Connecticut Birth Control Case, to the
doctrine of substantive due process-of the prevailing view that social
policy is now subject to judicial review on substantive grounds.
4
1
Rather than scouring the Constitution's hidden recesses for a nonex-
istent right of personal privacy, he squarely held on the basis of his
reading of the precedents that the right of a woman to procure an
abortion is part of the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
4
4
39. 410 U.S. 179, 221-222 (1973).
40. Id. at 222.
41. 410 U.S. 113, 172-177 (1973).
42. 410 U.S. 179, 209-221 (1973).
43. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
44. 410 U.S. 113, 167-171 (1973).
Vol. 25
KOMMERS: ABORTION & CONSTITUTION
B. The German Decision
On 25 February 1975, after eight months of judicial deliberation,
the Federal Constitutional Court invalidated § 218a of the Abortion
Reform Act and in effect directed Parliament to reestablish abortion
as a crime under the Penal Code. Until the enactment of a valid law,
the Court announced that the following rules would govern German
public policy on abortion: first, abortion would be permitted during
the first twelve weeks of pregnancy under § 218b of the Reform Act
for medical or eugenic indications; second, the termination of preg-
nancy by a licensed physician during the first twelve weeks after con-
ception would not be punishable if the pregnancy resulted from a
criminal assault; finally, the courts would have discretionary author-
ity to withhold criminal sanctions with regard to the termination of
pregnancy by physicians during the first twelve weeks in those situa-
tions where abortion is the only remaining measure reasonably ex-
pected to relieve pregnant women of a "grave hardship.
'45
In striking at the heart of the Act, the Court invoked Art. 2, § 2,
of the Basic Law, which says: "Everyone shall have the right to life
and to the inviolability of his person," what the Court calls an "objec-
tive value decision"--indeed the most fundamental value-of the Ger-
man Constitution. When read in tandem with Art. 1, § 1, directing
the state "to respect and protect" the dignity of man, Art. 2 incorpo-
rates an affirmative duty on the part of the state to secure and pre-
serve human life. In sharp contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
German tribunal met head-on the question of when human life begins:
"Life in the sense of the historical existence of a human individual
exists according to definite biological-physiological knowledge in any
case from the 14th day after conception." 46 The Constitutional Court
likewise rejected the notion, accepted by the Supreme Court, that the
human fetus is divisible into three equal parts signifying gradation
of personhood or humanness. "The process of development which has
begun at that point in time is a continuous process," said the Court,
"which cannot be sharply demarcated and does not allow a precise
division of the various stages in the development of human life.
' 47
Thus the Basic Law's command to respect human life-a command
likewise reflected in the abolition of capital punishment under Art.
102-fully extends to the fetus within the mother's womb.
45. 39 BVerfGE 2-3 (1975). The Court's authority to issue such orders-or
regulations is derived from BVerfGG § 35. It provides: "The Federal Consti-
tutional Court is authorized to designate who shall implement its judgment;
in individual cases it may also regulate the manner of its execution."
46. 39 BVerfG 37. The German text reads: "Leben im Sinne der ge-
schichtlichen Existenz seines menschlichen Individuums besteht nach gesicher-
ter biologisch-physiologischer Erkenntnis jedenfalls vom 14. Tage nach der
Empfaengnis (Nidation, Individuation) . .
47. Id.
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Broadly interpreting Art. 2, the Court construed "everyone" as
"everyone living," meaning "unborn life" as well as "born life." That
"developing life" or "germinating life" is indeed protected by Art. 2
the Court found abundantly supported in the deliberations leading to
the Basic Law's adoption.48 Indeed, the Court found buried in the
legislative history of the Act an assertion by its main supporters-
the Social and Free Democratic Parties-that the "legal value of un-
born life is to be respected in principle equally with that of born
life."
4 9
If this motivation was predominant, why then did the Court strike
down the statute? Because, according to the Justices, the state failed
adequately to balance the interests of the unborn child with those of
the mother. The Justices acknowledge that pregnancy falls within
that 'sphere of private relations constitutionally protected by Art. 2,
§1, of the Basic Law, which says: "Everyone shall have the right
to the free development of his personality in so far as he does not
violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order
or the moral code." As this wording indicates, the free development
of personality is a qualified right and in the case of pregnant women,
note the Justices, it is qualified by the existence of another life about
to become "an independent human being." The Court thereby rejects
any theory which would treat the decision of a woman not to become
pregnant in the first instance on the same level of constitutional pro-
tection as her decision to destroy a fetus once pregnancy has occurred.
"A balance which guarantees protection of unborn life and secures
the right of a pregnant woman to procure an abortion is not possible,"
declares the Court, "since the termination of pregnancy always means
the destruction of human life."5 0
Yet the Court is not prepared to rule that the Basic Law requires
the protection of unborn life regardless of the cost to the mother.
Some balancing between the rights of mother and fetus is permissible,
even while the Court notes-majority and minority justices alike-
that under the Basic Law "dignity" as used within the meaning of
Art. 1 ("The dignity of man shall be inviolable") inheres equally in
born and unborn life and is no more contingent on a human being's
consciousness of it than on his physical ability to preserve it.51 Hence
developing human life has dignity, and this dignity must be taken into
account, especially in the light of the developing fetus's inability to
defend itself, when a pregnant woman's claim to the protection of her
own dignity would result in terminating the developing life within
her.
48. 39 BVerfG 38-41.
49. Id. at 40-41.
50. Id. at 43.
51. Id. at 42-43.
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Accordingly, when balancing the right of the mother to the free
development of her personality (Art. 2, § 1) and the right of the un-
born child to life (Art. 2, § 2), the Court insists that "both constitu-
tional values be perceived in terms of their relationship to 'human
dignity,' which is the heart of the political value system under the
Constitution. '52 The rights of the unborn child and mother may be
balanced, emphasize the Justices, presumably in certain cases to the
ultimate detriment of the unborn child, so long as the rightful claims
of both are pondered within a framework-clearly demanded by the
Basic Law-of respect for the supreme value of human life.
At issue in this constitutional litigation is whether a life-regarding
framework of evaluation is provided by the counseling provisions of
the Abortion Reform Act. Under Art. 1 of the Basic Law the state
is obligated to respect and defend the dignity of man. This duty of
the state, declares the Court, is "comprehensive" (umfassend), for it
not only proscribes state infringement upon "developing life," but also
requires the state affirmatively to protect such life against illegal as-
sault by private parties, including the pregnant woman herself. To
defend human life as the ultimate value upon which all other rights
depend is thus a fundamental responsibility of the legal order under
the Basic Law.
53
But simply to assert that the supreme value of human life is at
stake is to beg large questions. Why are penal sanctions required to
safeguard unborn life? And which governmental body or state
agency shall be entrusted with this fundamental responsibility? The
Court conceded that it is the legislature's responsibility ordinarily to
determine the means by which fetal life is to be protected, subject
only to the recognition that in the first instance developing life "is
entrusted by nature to the protection of the mother." 54  Minimally,
in the Court's view, the state must seek to reinforce the mother's own
determination to protect unborn life, even if that requires the enact-
ment of social welfare measures to support a private decision to pre-
serve the fetus.55
The Court does not argue that the right of the unborn child to
life must always prevail over the right of the mother to self-determi-
nation. Nor does it insist that a law protecting post-natal life apply
with equal rigor to pre-natal life. The Justices acknowledge that un-
der the Basic Law the unborn child's right to life may impose a burden
upon the mother far in excess of the normal travail associated with
pregnancy. They concede that penal measures are an inadequate re-
52. Id. at 43. See also 34 BVerfGE 202, 223 (1974).
53. Id. at 44.
54. Id. at 45.
55. Id. at 50.
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sponse to situations where pregnancy leads to "grave hardship."5 6 In-
deed, a proper balancing of rights requires the state to respect a mor-
ally conscious decision to terminate a pregnancy whose continuance
would seriously and unreasonably impinge upon the ability of a
woman to preserve her own personhood. In removing such cases from
the reach of the criminal law however the state must not neglect
its duty to protect life; indeed the state is obligated to admonish the
pregnant woman of the necessity to preserve the right to life of the
unborn, to encourage her to continue the pregnancy, and to support
her through practical aid in cases of special difficulty. In all other
cases, say the Justices, abortion must remain a punishable offense
within the German legal order for the very reason that when
the termination of pregnancy results from mere whim or is unmoti-
vated by a severe condition of distress, it assumes the character of
an arbitrary act clearly subversive of the highest value of the Basic
Law. But even here, the decriminalization of abortion is justified un-
der the Basic Law only when other equally effective sanctions are
applied and only when the law clearly marks abortion as an illegal
act.
In the Court's mind, the Abortion Reform Act neither satisfied
these criteria nor the level of protection demanded of the state under
Art. 1 and 2 of the Basic Law. The Justices found § 218a of the Re-
form Act constitutionally defective, first, because it failed expressly
to embody an official disapproval of abortion during the first twelve
weeks of pregnancy and, second, because the counseling plan failed
to incorporate a pronounced pro-life orientation. When read together
with a supplementary statute, enacted after Parliament's approval of
the Reform Act, extending the coverage of the state's obligatory
health insurance program to the costs of an abortion, § 218a was
considered to be an unlawful encouragement to women wishing to
terminate their pregnancies. A valid abortion policy, suggested the
Court, must affirm the dignity of unborn life. Indeed a formal statu-
tory condemnation of abortion is necessary to foreclose any inference
that the destruction of fetal life during the first twelve weeks of preg-
nancy is morally or legally a permissible act. 57 In ordinary circum-
stances, noted the Court, "abortion is an act of killing that the law
is obligated to condemn." 58
Yet the state is not absolutely required to protect unborn life
through penal sanctions. "The decisive factor," said the Court, "is
whether the totality of measures protecting unborn life, be they socio-
legal or penal in character, is a real safeguard corresponding to the
56. Id. at 48. By "grave hardship" the Court is referring to a severe con-
dition of social, economic, or psychological distress.
57. Id. at 53.
58. id. at 46.
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importance of the legal value to be secured."59  On the other hand,
punishment must be exacted for the procurement of an abortion if
no other means is adequate to protect the life of the unborn child.
The penal sanction must be proportionate to the legal value threat-
ened with extinction. Thus, as a general principle, "the elementary
value of human life requires criminal law punishment for its destruc-
tion." 60
Even a statutory affirmation of the sanctity of unborn life would
have been insufficient here because of other fatal defects in the coun-
seling plan under the Abortion Reform Act. Although a woman is
required to go to a counseling center and confer with a physician, she
-in the Court's reading of the statute--effectively has the option un-
der the Act of destroying the fetus no matter what the reason. More-
over, the plan provides no assurances that the woman will be moti-
vated to carry on her pregnancy. Informational services alone, im-
parted neutrally by a counseling center, are not sufficient. Nor is
the advice of physicians adequate; they would be functioning outside
of their expertise when acting as counselors, for they are not trained
to proffer professional advice or help in cases requiring an assessment
of social need. Indeed, the very physician consulted by the woman
wishing to abort a fetus is entitled under the Act to give the required
counseling; such a person, the Court surmises, is not likely to work
toward the goal demanded by the Constitution.6 '
To satisfy the spirit of the Basic Law, hinted the Justices, the
counseling centers themselves would have to be prepared to provide
material relief, moral encouragement, and other forms of direct as-
sistance to pregnant women. 2 Positive programs of this kind might
in the eyes of the Court begin to approach the threshold of constitu-
tionality. Whether such agencies would in fact meet constitutional
standards was not decided in this case, however. Actually, the thrust
of the case is to affirm the necessity of penal sanctions if unborn life
is to be adequately safeguarded under the German legal order.
As noted earlier, the Abortion Reform Act was predicated on the
notion that preventive measures would be more effective in protecting
fetal life than penal sanctions. But it was the Justices' conviction
that the inadequacy of the old law consisted mainly in its failure to
discriminate between abortions arbitrarily procured and those war-
ranted by legitimate indications, causing a rising number of illegal
59. Id.
60. Id. at 47.
61. Id. at 62-63.
62. Id. at 61. Counseling centers so equipped were actually recommended
by 16 criminal law scholars in an "Alternative Draft" considered by Parlia-
ment and which, according to the Court, was actually the basis of the counsel-
ing idea.
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abortions. The Abortion Case would now happily end this confusion
and put the state on notice that certain terminations of pregnancy
are clearly criminal acts demanding prosecution and punishment.
The Court also seemed impressed with predictions, buttressed by
statistics concerning the effects of liberal abortion policies in England
and East Germany, that if the Abortion Reform Act were validated
the incidence of abortions would rise appreciably. The Court was cog-
nizant of the trend toward more liberalized abortion policies
in other western countries and cited the examples of Sweden, Austria,
England, and France. However, disregarding the fact that these poli-
cies were sharply controverted, the Justices pointed out that the legal
standards of these countries do not apply to West Germany.
8
The Court closed its argument by noting that the Basic Law must
be understood "in the light of the historical experience and the spir-
itual-moral confrontation with the system of National Socialism,"
which stripped men of their dignity and denied the value of human
life. Out of the death and destruction of the Nazi era arose a new
Constitution-the Basic Law-which reaffirmed "human life" as the
highest value of the political order. Moreover, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court was created to insure that this value and other fundamen-
tal principles of the Basic Law would be observed by all organs of
the State. Thus, in nullifying the Abortion Reform Act, the Court
was doing nothing less or more than upholding the Republic's Consti-
tution.
64
The Abortion Reform Act was invalidated by a 6 to 2 vote of the
First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court. Justices Wiltraut
Rupp v. BrUnneck and Helmut Simon wrote a common dissenting
opinion. The minority opinion does not take issue-indeed it affirmed
-the majority's conclusion that human life is a primary value of the
legal order and that there is a constitutional duty on the part of the
state to protect unborn life. Striking the same note as the dissenting
opinions in the American cases, the minority rebukes the Court for
ignoring the principles of judicial restraint by substituting its judg-
ment of how best to protect the value of human life for that of the
legislature. The question is not whether but how the value of human
life is to be protected, remark the two Justices. "This question," they
insist, "is a matter of legislative responsibility. 6 5
The minority argument proceeds as follows: the traditional role
of the Federal Constitutional Court has been one of protecting the
rights of citizens against state encroachment. But here, in an unprece-
dented step, the Court seizes upon an objective value decision of the
63. Id. at 66-67.
64. Id. at 67.
65. Id. at 69.
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Basic Law-namely the state's duty to protect human life-as a basis
for requiring the legislature to criminalize abortion and therefore ef-
fectively to invade the sphere of personal liberty 6 This is contrary
to the spirit of the Basic Law and at variance with the original intent
of the framers. While required constitutionally to justify the imposi-
tion of a criminal penalty for certain conduct, the legislature is under
no obligation to justify the replacement of a criminal statute with a
social policy deemed more effective than punishment as a means of
realizing a given constitutional value. The principles of political
democracy and separation of powers place such a decision squarely
in legislative hands. Furthermore, it is a fundamental misconstruc-
tion of the Basic Law to suggest that any particular solution to a social
problem is constitutionally required. 7 The social system is being or-
dered here, and to transfer this function from the legislature to the
judiciary is to convert the Court into a "political arbitration board
for choosing between alternative legislative proposals. '6 This is not
to say that the Court is never justified in reviewing legislation imple-
menting or promoting an objective value of the Constitution, for the
"Court could oppose the legislature when the latter has completely
disregarded a value decision or when the nature and manner of its
realization is clearly defective." 69 But the Abortion Reform Act was
reasonable, having been adopted after an exhaustive parliamentary
investigation, and fully consonant with the policy of other "western
civilized states." 70
The minority chided the Court for paying insufficient attention
to the complexity of the social problem surrounding abortion. Social
change and changing social values (abrupt and direct in the area of
sexual morality), the high incidence of illegal abortions, the unenforci-
bility of existing penal sanctions, and the discriminatory effect of not
enforcing these sanctions are among the problems addressed by the
66. Id. at 71. It is important to note the customary distinction in German
constitutional law between objective values and subjective rights. Both are
derived from the list of fundamental rights in the Basic Law (Art. 1 through
19). Objective value decisions (objective Wertentscheidungen) are generally
norms of political order which govern the exercise of state power; they require
affirmative action (actives Handeln) by the state on a continuing basis since
the construction of a socially just political order is a permanent task (stiIndige
Aufgabe); as such this duty falls naturally and logically, under a system of
divided power, to the legislature. Subjective rights, called "defense rights"
(Abwehrrechte) by the two justices in the minority, are those which individ-
ual persons seek to vindicate against incursion by specific state actions; they
are rights with an identifiable content; most notably, they are rights amend-
able to judicial resolution because of the availability of concrete standards of
judgment developed over time on a case-by-case basis.
67. 39 BVerfG 71-73 (1975).
68. Id. at 72.
69. Id. at 73.
70. Id. at 69.
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legislature. On the basis of its findings, the minority noted, the legis-
lature sought to structure a workable remedy for protecting unborn
life. But that remedy was also fashioned in awareness of the moral
dilemma confronting women who consider abortion as a means of es-
caping mental strain or social hardship. Here the "uniqueness of the
interruption of pregnancy," as opposed to other ways of endangering
life, is stressed. 71 The destruction of a fetus in the early months of
pregnancy is of a different order than ordinary homicide, for the latter
can be deterred in no other way than through criminal law. It is
the unique unity of "actor" and "victim" that may warrant other than
criminal means to preserve unborn life. 72 The objective values of the
Basic Law do not preclude the legislature from devising measures to
protect life that are based on the traditional distinction, rooted in
European legal history and the canon law of the nineteenth century,
between born and unborn life. Furthermore, the mother's unique re-
lationship to the fetus requires an immense investment of psychologi-
cal and physical energy if a child is to be cared for adequately. It
is nature which tells a mother that she must secure and protect the
life of the child en ventre sa mere. Hence a criminal statute is not
necessary "by nature" (von Natur aus) to secure protection of unborn
life and, more importantly, may not be the most effective way of
achieving this objective.
Justice Rupp von BrUnneck (the only woman on the Court) intro-
duces a female perspective into the minority argument by her refer-
ence to the "natural feelings of the woman,' '7 which in her view is
legally relevant to the legislature's decision to adopt a "term" rather
than an "indications" solution to the abortion problem. The argument
is psychological and refers to a "growing maternal relationship" and
"corresponds to different embryonic stages of development. '74 Her
point is that this relationship is far stronger in the later stages of
pregnancy than in the first trimester. Thus she regards the equating
of an abortion in the early weeks of pregnancy with intentional mur-
der as morally naive and legally untenable. The argument is even
rooted in theological considerations, for she supports her view by ref-
erence to canon law and the theory of ensoulment, which in the 19th
century held abortion performed up to the 80th day after conception
to be free from punishment.
75
Still, in the end, the objective of the statute is to protect life and
the burden is upon the court to show that the Abortion Reform Act
is deficient in this respect. The minority points out that the legal
71. Id. at 78.
72. Id. at 79.
73. Id. at 80.
74. Id. at 81.
75. Id.
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protection of life is never complete or foolproof-a trivial observation
since the same could be said of any area of law-and that the counsel-
ing scheme of the Reform Act has weaknesses. But then any solution
to the problem is likely to be at best a "patchwork" (Stiickwerk). The
old criminal law was a patchwork; the new Reform Act is a patch-
work; but at least it is based on the hope that more rather than less
protection for life will be the result.75a
IV. THE ABORTION CASES: AN ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW
Let us restate the main constitutional rulings and principles of
the German and American abortion cases. The American case holds
that the right to privacy, founded upon the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty, is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. A zone of pri-
vacy is created within which the decision to procure an abortion is
exclusively that of the pregnant woman and her physician. Accord-
ingly, the state has no legitimate interest whatever in preventing abor-
tions from occurring within the first trimester of pregnancy. Its only
interest is seeing to it that abortions are performed under circum-
stances that insure adequate surgical procedures and care for patients.
Yet the right to procure an abortion is not absolute, and so, following
the first trimester of pregnancy, the state may begin to assert impor-
tant interests in maintaining medical standards. It may assert these
interests because an abortion performed in the second trimester is a
greater medical risk than one performed in the first trimester. It is
only in the last trimester, when the fetus becomes viable and poten-
tially able to survive outside of the womb, that the state may promote
its interest in protecting future life, but even during this period the
unborn child may be destroyed, medical standards permitting, to pre-
serve the life or health of the mother. What we have here is a con-
stitutional policy on abortion based on the Court's conclusion that a
fetus or unborn child is not a "person" within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The German Case holds that "developing life" in the womb is an
independent legal value protected by Art. 2 of the Basic Law. Life
within the meaning of the Basic Law begins on the fourteenth day
after conception, approximately at the stage of implantation. Abor-
tion after that stage of development is an act of killing and the law
must so indicate. Under the Constitution, the state is duty-bound to
protect and foster this life-i.e., the fetus or unborn child in utero-
75a. Since this article was written, the Bundestag has amended § 218
bringing it into line with the Court's directive. The new version of § 218
provides for a comprehensive counseling system for women contemplating
abortion. See Fiinfzehntes Strafrechtsinderungsgesetz of 18 May 1976, BGB1.
1 1213 (1976).
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and under no circumstances is the state permitted to destroy this life.
The affirmative duty of the state to protect the fetus must be exer-
cised even against the wishes of the mother. Thus, the right of the
child in the womb generally takes precedence over the right of the
pregnant woman to self-determination or to the free development of
personality. It is not absolutely necessary that criminal law be used
as the sole instrument of protecting fetal life; measures other than
punishment are permissible. The crucial requirement is that the to-
tality of measures designed to protect unborn life be appropriate to
the significance of the legal value safeguarded by the Constitution.
If that value can only be protected by the threat of punishment, then
punishment is indeed constitutionally required. Yet, the Basic Law
does not require extraordinary sacrifice on the part of the woman,
nor does it imply that the woman's constitutional right to self-determi-
nation is wholly subordinate to the welfare of the fetus. Thus, a preg-
nancy may be terminated if necessary to protect the woman's life or
to guard against the serious impairment of her health. In addition,
abortion is free of punishment in those situations where the woman
can be expected to undergo serious social hardship. It is clear that
such hardship must be out of the ordinary and far in excess of the
burdens ordinarily associated with pregnancy. Finally, any counsel-
ing system designed for women contemplating abortion must incorpo-
rate a positive attitude toward life and seek to persuade and, if neces-
sary, materially to help women see their pregnancies through.
A. Legal Cultures
How shall we analyze these two decisions? An explanation of
their differing doctrinal positions requires some consideration of the
legal culture and socio-political values of the two countries, especially
West Germany. The socio-political values to which we refer are clear
enough and will be discussed further below. The concept of "legal
culture" is inexact and rather limited as an explanatory device; never-
theless, if cautiously employed, it can be a useful analytical tool. Here
we use the concept of legal culture to describe "a set of deeply rooted,
historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the
role of law in the society and the polity, about the proper organization
and operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or should
be made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught.
'70
Clearly there is no space here to explore in detail these several
aspects of Germany's legal culture. But we will mention a couple
of ideas on law and the judicial role -that loom important in German
legal theory and which seem relevant to this analysis. First, owing
in part to the 19th century movement for codification of German pri-
76. Ehrmann, Comparative Legal Cultures 8 (1976).
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vate law and in part to the intense drive for a powerful national state,
law has come to be regarded as a highly unified and logically arranged
system of rules governing nearly every aspect of human relations. In
this view, law is architectonic; it "texturizes" the entire society, giving
it unity of direction and purpose. This conception of law is one reason
the state stands out as a rich and living reality in 19th century Ger-
man jurisprudence. It is also the reason why the Rechtsstaat (law
state) is a pivotal concept in German constitutionalism, embodying
the notion of equal justice under law.
Under the taught-tradition of German law, law is exclusively stat-
utory in nature, and it is the solemn duty of an independent judiciary
to apply that law in strict conformance with the legislative or, more
accurately, "general" will. The taught-tradition has also influenced
the process of constitutional interpretation in West Germany and judi-
cial role perceptions. German justices tend to be less sociological in
their approach to constitutional interpretation than their counterparts
on the American Supreme Court. The Basic Law's meaning is to be
discerned from the literal text of the Constitution read in the light
of the Founding Fathers' intent. Those justices who take a broader
view of their role tend to emphasize the objectivity of the judicial
decision-making process. Consider the following remarks by former
Justice Gerhard Leibholz:
In the procedure in which it is to be determined whether a
statutory norm is in conformity with the Constitution or not,
we are concerned with an objective procedure. Correspond-
ing to this characteristic of the norm control procedure, the
declarations of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany
have an effect erga omnes. It is consequently not surprising
that the Court decisions, in so far as they contain a deter-
mination that a law is not (or is) in conformity with the
Basic Law or other federal law, are published by the Fed-
eral Minister of Justice in the Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal
Gazette). In other words, the decisions of the Federal Con-
stitutional Court have statutory force. In addition, such de-
cisions claim a fundamentally retroactive effect. They apply
ex tunc and not ex nunc. The decision on unconstitutionality
of a statute by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany
results, in principle, in its absolute nullity. ...
This norm control is, therefore, of basic importance for the
entire constitutional jurisdiction, for under it the ancient
tension between the law of nature and positive law-between
justice and law-arises. With the help of a constitutional
examination of statutes, the norm control system is designed
to counter the point of view that "right" can be fully incor-
porated in a statute. In the certainty that there is a higher
law which finds expression, in particular, in the catalogues
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of basic rights in the constitution, constitutional norm con-
trol finds its ultimate justification.
77
The emphasis here upon legal certainty is strong and explains why
the authority to nullify legislative statutes is vested exclusively in the
Constitutional Court; it also explains the high value Constitutional
Court Justices attribute to unanimity on the Court, even though since
1971 the Justices have been legally empowered to publish dissenting
opinions. (The Abortion Case is one of those rare instances in which
First Senate Justices have published their dissenting views.)
While the legal order broadly reflects community feeling and val-
ues-the Volksgeist according to Savigny-constitutional interpreta-
tion in West Germany does not respond to the immediate "felt necessi-
ties" of the time. Those "felt necessities," whatever they may be-
and they are not manifest in the abortion dispute-cannot be allowed,
in the German view, to nullify or attenuate the central values pro-
claimed by the constitution. The German decision mentioned two ele-
ments of contemporary experience, the widespread incidence of illegal
abortion and the Nazi slaughter of defenseless and innocent persons;
but in the end these considerations seemed not to loom very large
in the reasoning of the Court, although the Court did note that the
Founding Fathers had the Nazi experience in mind when they in-
cluded a right to life in the Basic Law.
B. Religion
Students of the American judicial process, particularly those of
the behavioral persuasion, would be inclined to find the causes of the
Abortion decision in the background characteristics and personal be-
liefs of the German Justices. Indeed one might suppose, as has been
suggested, that the German Court's mind was influenced by the reli-
gious affiliation of the Justices and particularly by the Catholic pres-
ence on the Court. Yet only three of the eight Justices who decided
the case are Catholics. Exactly half of the Justices in the majority,
including President Ernst Benda, who occupies a crucial place in the
decisional process, are Protestants. It might be added that the princi-
ples of the Abortion Case are incompatible with the prevailing view
among Catholic theologians, which holds that ensoulment takes place
with fertilization, whereas the Court held that the fetus assumes the
character of personhood at the point of implantation, which occurs
fourteen days after conception. In addition, the Court held that abor-
tions are constitutionally permissible in cases of severe hardship (so-
cial indications), whereas the prevailing Catholic theological position
holds that the direct and purposeful destruction of the fetus is never
77. Leibholz, "The West German Constitutional Court," in McWhinney &
Pescatore, Federalisme et Cours Suprimes et L'integration des Systemes
Juridiques 57 (1975).
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permissible. Ironically, it was the minority opinion that appealed to
theology and canon law in partial support of its conclusion that the
destruction of the fetus in the early months of pregnancy does not
constitute conduct deserving of criminal punishment.
Whatever the personal beliefs of the Justices, the German decision
is distinguished by the fact that it does not explicitly rely upon the
theology of any particular denomination or religious tradition. In the
main body of the Court's opinion there is no reference to theological
thinking or religious belief. Rather, constitutional reasoning is the
predominant mode of analysis and the main strength of the German
decision; the Court's argument is based exclusively on its analysis of
legislative history, constitutional language, judicial precedents, and
the intent of the Constitution's framers. The Court did not find any
utility or relevance in reciting, as did the U.S. Supreme Court, the
history of religious or philosophical reflection about the beginning of
life. Biological knowledge and human experience were, for the Ger-
man Court, sufficient to decide this case. "Life in the sense of the
historical existence of a human individual," to reiterate the Court's
argument, "exists according to definite biological-physiological knowl-
edge in any case from the fourteenth day after conception. '7 8
The terms "life" and "human dignity," which appear in the text
of the Basic Law, were of course interpreted in the light of the nation's
experience and culture, which obviously includes religious influences.
But then constitutionalism itself has an ultimate religious basis. Karl
Friedrich teaches that the very idea of "constitutionalism is rooted
in certain basic beliefs, the belief in the dignity of man and the belief
in man's inclination to abuse power. These beliefs rest upon religious
convictions."'7 9 Few American or German Justices would deny the
religious dimension of constitutionalism. The point to be made here
is that this religious dimension is ultimate rather than proximate and
broadly cultural rather than narrowly denominational. And so, when
the German Justices probed the concept of "human dignity" to discern
the juridical meaning of "life," they were engaging no more and no
less in religious reflection than was Justice Brennan when he asserted
in Furman v. Georgia that capital punishment is "inhuman" and fails
to "comport with human dignity," or when Justice Marshall opined
in the same case that it offends the "conscience of society."8 0 Or, to
put the matter differently, the presuppositions of Roe v. Wade are
no less religious than those of the German Abortion Case. After all,
the value of privacy is squarely rooted in the historical belief in man's
spirituality, out of which grew a theory of personal autonomy.
78. 39 BVerfG 37.
79. Friedrich, Limited Government: A Comparison 123 (1974).
80. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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C. Social Philosophies
A more plausible explanation for the German decision is to be
found in certain normative aspects of the Basic Law. The Constitu-
tion might be said to be normative in the sense that it protects certain
kinds of values and community interests. The Basic Law embodies
a conception of political order that includes an ethical minimus con-
sensus rooted in the moral tradition of the West. Whereas American
constitutionalism emphasizes a rugged individualism in the exercise
of personal freedom, German constitutionalism has a larger communi-
tarian thrust with a corresponding limitation upon the exercise of po-
litical freedom. This difference between American and German con-
stitutionalism is one of emphasis, yet important to an understanding
of the varying constitutional policies of the two countries.
The argument is in need of amplification. If we accept here the
conventional "Madisonian" view of American constitutionalism, we
will regard the political order as a democracy unencumbered by any
substantive definition of the public interest and encouraging a plural-
ism of private interests and moral persuasions. Politics is a method
by which group interests are served and freedom is a value primarily
in the service of the individual. In this sense, American constitution-
alism fails to incorporate a specific notion of the common good or a
concept of authority responsible for directing men toward goodness.
The German notion of freedom, on the other hand, if this inter-
pretation of the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence is correct, in-
cludes the classical proposition that men fulfill themselves in com-
munity with others. There is of course a private sphere which the
Basic Law protects. Certain rights of the human person are beyond
the reach of the state, for human dignity can subsist, in the modern
German constitutional view, only when men are allowed to achieve
moral freedom and to act on their moral convictions. But the Consti-
tution sets boundaries to the exercise of freedom. For example, "[e] v-
eryone shall have the right to the free development of his personality,"
but only "in so far as he does not violate the rights of others or offend
the constitutional order or the moral code" (Art. 2, % 1). Freedom
of speech is likewise "limited by the provisions of the general laws,
provisions of law for the protection of youth, and by the right to the
inviolability of personal honor" (Art. 5, 2). Freedom to teach "does
not absolve from loyalty to the Constitution" (Art. 5, 3). The right
of association is guaranteed, but activities "directed against constitu-
tional order or the concept of international understanding are prohib-
ited" (Art. 9). The one principle which can in no way be encroached
upon is "human dignity;" indeed, under the terms of Art. 79, Art. 1
(which proclaims "the inviolability of man's dignity") it is beyond
Parliament's amendatory power. The Basic Law also sets up a "so-
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cial" federal state (Art. 20) and underscores the values of marriage
and family life while placing mothers under "the care and protection
of the community" (Art. 6). Political parties are even instructed to
"participate in forming the political will of the people" (Art. 21, italics
supplied). These constitutional norms are part of the living fabric
of German constitutional law, and fairly accurately reflect values an-
chored in Germany's social and political traditions.
Free speech jurisprudence offers an illustration of opposing con-
stitutional policies based on the different orientations of the German
and American constitutions. Perhaps the strongest current in the
broad stream of American free speech theory is the Holmesian "free
trade in ideas" view---"that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. '81 The
doctrine is pragmatic and relativistic. Authority does not guide men
toward truth; rather the market determines it. And as the market
changes, so does truth. In American theory it is not the purpose of
political discourse to arrive at truths by which permanently to live;
at least those truths may not be incorporated into public law in such
a way as to forbid any person or group from attacking them verbally
or to foreclose changing them by political means. The individualism
implied in the American theory is manifested most clearly by Supreme
Court cases effectively immunizing citizens against libel suits arising
out of false allegations against public officials and public figures. 82
The Basic Law requires political man to observe certain traditions
of civility when making public utterances. German constitutional
theory regards political discourse as an exernise in reasonable debate
and as a means of achieving the public good. This requires that men
speak the truth. The constitutional value of "personal honor," allied
as it is to the concept of "human dignity," permits actions against
newspapers and individual citizens for their false and misleading
statements about public officials and ordinary citizens.83 Indeed, pub-
lic officials are entitled to special protection under West German libel
laws, whereas the reverse is true in the United States. Utterances
about public officials in the United States, however distorted or un-
truthful, may not constitutionally be punished by state libel laws un-
less it can be shown that the utterances are made with actual mali-
cious intent, which is difficult to prove since to do so one must show
that the statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. '84 In Germany,
81. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
82. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Curtis
Pub. Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), Garrison
v. Lousiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
83. See Judgment of 24 Feb. 1971, 30 BVerfG 173.
84. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
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free speech is limited by the necessity to preserve public order and
to maintain the community's respect for the authority of the state as
reflected in the personhood of its high officials. The prevailing Amer-
ican theory of free speech seems consistent with one aspect of the Su-
preme Court's vision of the political order. As the one-man one-vote
principle put forth in the apportionment cases so forcefully shows, 5
political man is an autonomous agent in an atomistic society, for he
speaks for himself and he votes alone.
D. Abortion Depoliticized
Thus, although the logic of Roe v. Wade leaves much to be desired,
the result affirms themes central to a major tradition of American
constitutionalism. The effect of that decision is to deny the individual
states the right to consider, in shaping their abortion policies, the com-
munity's interest in protecting the fetus. In effect, the Court was say-
ing that the question of whether a woman has the right to procure
an abortion is not an issue to be effectively considered in the public
realm. Thus, oddly enough, free speech cannot be used here to influ-
ence the development of public policy. The decision seems perfectly
consistent with Madisonian liberalism: the constitutional order is to
serve the individual and his interest. In the Supreme Court's Wel-
tanschauung, society is not viewed as fundamentally communitarian
in nature. Just as the apportionment cases see the individual voter
as an autonomous political agent, Roe v. Wade sees the human person
as an autonomous moral agent. A woman is thus entitled to separate
herself from the community while the community is rendered power-
less to act in its common defense for the purpose of safeguarding
shared values. It is the Fourteenth Amendment concept of "liberty"
that is given overwhelming significance in Roe v. Wade, to the virtual
exclusion of countervailing considerations that might have been
deemed to inhere in the related concepts of "person" and "life." As
one writer noted: "The basic assumption of the whole [American]
system is very clear: no partial community may impose its substan-
tive vision of the good life on the whole community. On the level
of the whole, our unity is formal, not substantive.
'86
In another sense, however, the Supreme Court did underscore the
importance of unity, although not the unity or a community glued
together by a moral consensus. In the Court's view, this moral con-
sensus does not exist, and the Court is probably correct here. It ap-
pears that Justice Blackmun's dreary recitation of the history of moral
85. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
86. Schaar, "Some Ways of Thinking About Equality," 26 The Journal of
Politics 891 (1964).
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and philosophical thinking about abortion was actually intended to
illustrate this lack of consensus. What other reason could there have
been for his long prologue to the merits of the case? Surely it pro-
vided no theological or scientific basis for dividing pregnancy into
three periods and formulating different constitutional rules pertaining
to each. The Court's interest seemed to lie in the promotion of social
peace-a policy of "live and let live"-best achieved through the con-
stitutional right of privacy.
In a pluralistic society composed of a multitude of belief systems,
the Court seems intent on keeping certain issues-those likely to be
religiously or theologically divisive-out of the forum of effective pub-
lic discussion. By not allowing the abortion question to be legisla-
tively determined, the Court has effectively "depoliticized" the issue.
If the people's representatives are incapable of acting on an issue after
its exhaustion by discussion, it makes no sense, politically, to talk
about it. Lemon v. Kurtzman, where the Court invalidated a Pennsyl-
vania statute reimbursing church-related schools for costs of teachers
salaries and textbooks in specific secular subjects, is an even clearer
illustration of the Court's attempt to "depoliticize" a public issue and,
incidentally-to return to the anti-communitari-an theme-to erode
the significance of religion as an intermediating agency between the
individual and mass society. Remarked Chief Justice Burger: "Ordi-
narily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan,
are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of
government, but political division along religious lines was one of the
principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to
protect. The potential divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to the
normal political process."' 7 Thus is social peace achieved.
This analysis is a rather circumspect way of saying that the result
in Roe v. Wade not only conforms to the individualistic ethic at the
heart of the conventional "Madisonian" interpretation of American
constitutionalism, but is also understandable in the light of the plural-
istic nature of American society. But then so is German society
pluralistic, both religiously and socially, just as there is a wide variety
of views in the population on whether abortion should be permitted.
On the other hand, the clearly dominant opinion in the German legis-
lature and Federal Constitutional Court is that under the Basic Law
the State has a duty to protect unborn life and, what is more, to in-
struct the people that the taking of unborn life is an offense against
human dignity, although these institutions are in disagreement over
whether this objective is best achieved by criminalization or decrimi-
nalization of abortion. But as the German justices have said on nu-
merous occasions, the Basic Law is not a "value free" Constitution;
87. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
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rather, it stands for values that "all state authority" is obligated to
protect for the sake of the community or, as the Constitution puts
it, "the free democratic basic order."
At the risk of exaggerating the actual difference between judicial
role perceptions and methods of constitutional interpretation in West
Germany and the United States, we want to suggest that the German
decision is also compatible with a legal culture that emphasizes a
taught tradition of analytical jurisprudence. In the Abortion Case the
German Justices were governed by their own rationality and not by
the existing mores of society. The decision did not essentially rest
on sociological analysis, although this is not to suggest that a sociologi-
cal analysis would necessarily have led to a contrary result.
Measured by any logical test that we would wish to apply, the
constitutional reasoning in the German Case is more tightly argued
and more analytically precise than the argument advanced in Roe v.
Wade. The German opinion is carefully crafted and composed in
measured language, leaving little room for doubt or ambiguity with
regard to its meaning. On the other hand, the privacy argument in
Roe v. Wade is confusing and even contradictory. In the end, the
American decision does not lend itself to a clear and unambiguous
interpretation. Justice Douglas was even impelled to write a concur-
ring opinion to hedge against a too narrow interpretation of the
Court's opinion, studiously avoiding, for example, any reference to
"potential life," a concept that Blackmun introduced as a limitation
of privacy. Chief Justice Burger, on the other hand, concurred in
what amounted to a near dissent by warning against a too broad inter-
pretation of the opinion and by deploring Blackmun's use of current
medical knowledge in support of the opinion. Of course, eroded logic
is one of the costs of the high value that the justices as well as Ameri-
cans generally place on the practice of individualized opinion writing
on the Supreme Court. In Germany, such personalized expressions
of opinion remain a clear exception to the rule. The law-certainly
the highest law of the land-ideally speaks with one voice in Ger-
many's legal culture, underscoring both the authority and the unity
of the law.
E. The Democratic Process
Finally, we return to the relationship between the judiciary and
the legislature. The American Supreme Court has sought to democra-
tize the political process mainly by standing watch at the ballot box
and by insuring that each citizen's vote is counted equally, as well
as by protecting free speech. The Court has succeeded in installing
what might be called a regime of numerical majoritarianism. It is
unconcerned with the quality of political representation once the vot-
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ing is over. And yet, despite its expectation and apparent belief that
the one-man one-vote principle will bring public policy more in accord
with the will of the electorate, the Court is as ready as ever to strike
down legislation no matter how representative of the popular will.
As seen through the eyes of the German Justices, the democratic
process is more elaborate than the American conception. Law in Ger-
many is an expression of community feelings and expectations. Those
expectations and feelings are crystallized through a democratic politi-
cal order powered by elections and political parties. Under the Basic
Law, the latter "participate in forming the political will of the people"
(Art. 21), a will that finds its eventual representation in the will of
the state when it is converted and refined into public law by Parlia-
ment and other state organs.
One reason why these remarks about the democratic process are
relevant is that in the Abortion Case the Court seemed somewhat
troubled by the series of quick votes, in the absence of meaningful
parliamentary debate, leading to the passage of the Abortion Reform
Act in the Seventh Bundestag. The Court seemed distressed by the
failure of the Seventh Bundestag to heed the recommendations' of the
Sixth Bundestag, during which time there was much public and par-
liamentary debate on abortion, and to abide by the life-regarding prin-
ciples which, in the Court's view, informed those recommendations.
The constitutional ruling in the Abortion Case seems in part to have
been attributable to the Court's belief that the political will of the
people had not found adequate expression in the Abortion Reform Act.
In effect, the Court turned back the clock to where the Bundestag
had been in its deliberations when Parliament was suddenly dissolved
in 1972 and actually seemed to be inviting the Bundestag to return
to the apparent consensus that had been achieved prior to 1972.
The German and American Abortion Cases are both products of
political regimes in which judicial review plays a central role in the
process of government. The enlightened conscience of a future gener-
ation may condemn Roe v. Wade in tones that we now reserve for
the despised Dred Scott case. Or it may regard Roe v. Wade as an-
other step on man's road to freedom. Or men may take a middle posi-
tion, much like the German Court, and seek a balancing of rights.
Whatever the future may hold in this regard, the magnitude of the
power that certain constitutional democracies have conferred on their
courts of law must be clear to the men of this generation. The rever-
sal of legislative policies as important to society as American state
anti-abortion laws and the German Abortion Reform Act is a very
serious matter. But the judicial overriding of legislative policy on
the ground of constitutionality is apparently one of the prices that
citizens within a constitutional regime that confers such authority on
its courts are willing to pay.
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